Consider the classical ElGamal digital signature scheme based on the modular relation α m ≡ y r r s [p]. In this work, we prove that if we can compute a natural integer i such that α i mod p is smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to sign any given document without knowing the secret key. Therefore we extend and reinforce Bleichenbacher's attack presented at Eurocrypt'96.
Introduction
It was in 1976 that Diffie and Hellman published their famous paper "New directions in cryptography" [4] . For the first time in communication history, they provided us with a mechanism that guarantees the confidentiality of documents and data we like to exchange over a public and insecure channel. This event is at the origin of the public key cryptography [4, 14, 13] . Since then, many original cryptographical methods were conceived and proposed to solve a variety of communication problems like identification, authentication, integrity or 0-knowledge proof. However, the most important field in public key cryptography is probably the digital signature protocol. Its requirement in e-business for funds transferring, makes it a sensitive question. Let us recall the principle. For the user Alice we prepare two kind of keys.
The first, y, is public and must be largely diffused to the other users. The second, x, is private and must be kept secret. When Alice decides to sign a document M , she has to solve a difficult problem, in general a mathematical equation. This problem is depending of Alice public key y and of the document M . It is constructed in a way such that nobody, except Alice, can solve it. With the help of her secret key x, Alice is able to give the answer.
The equation is based on a hard question in mathematics like factorization or discrete logarithm problem. We cannot forge Alice signature, but anyone like a judge can verify that the solution she gives is valid.
Let p be a prime number and α a primitive element modulo p. The discrete logarithm problem consists of solving the modular equation α x ≡ β [p], where β is a fixed integer and x is the unknown variable. In 1978, Pohlig and Hellman [12] elaborated an efficient algorithm when p − 1 is B−smooth. In 1985, ElGamal [6] proposed a public key cryptosystem and one of the first digital signature protocols both based on the discrete logarithm. Nobody knows how he found his difficult signature equation. Several variants of the signature scheme were developed [15, 5, 10 [9] proved that, when we use ElGamal method to sign two documents, if the secret nonces k 1 , k 2 are less than the square root of the prime modulus p, then we can compute the secret key of the signer and break all the system. In 2011, the author slightly extended Bleichenbacher's attack [8] .
Let α m ≡ y r r s [p] be the ElGamal classical signature equation. In this work, we show that if we can compute a natural integer i such that α i mod p is B−smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to sign any given document without knowing the secret key. As a consequence, we prove that if (p, α, y) is Alice public key, and if one the four positive integers α, p − α, it is certainly easier to break ElGamal signature scheme than to solve the discrete logarithm problem.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly recall the classical ElGamal signature scheme. Section 3 is devoted to the review of Bleichenbacher's attack [2, 3] . Our contribution is presented in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
Throughout this article, we will adopt ElGamal paper notations [5] . Z, N are respectively the sets of integers and non-negative integers. For every positive integer n, we denote by Z n the finite ring of modular integers and by Z * n the multiplicative group of its invertible elements. 
Classical ElGamal signature
In this section we recall the basic ElGamal signature scheme [6, 16 p.287, 10 p.454, 11 p.183].
Alice chooses three numbers:
-p, a large prime integer.
-α, a primitive element (or a generator) [10, p.69 ] of the finite multiplicative group Z * p -x, a random element belonging to the set {2, 3, ..., p − 2}.
Then she computes y = α x mod p. Alice public keys are (p, α, y), and x is her private key.
2. To sign the message m, Alice needs to solve the equation :
where r, s are the unknown variables.
Alice fixes arbitrary r to be r = α k mod p, where k is chosen randomly and invertible modulo p − 1. Equation (1) is then equivalent to :
As Alice knows the secret key x, and as the integer k is invertible modulo p − 1, she computes the second unknown variable s: 
Bleichenbacher's attack
In this part we recall Bleichenbacher's remarquable attack presented at the Eurocrypt'96 conference [2] . Here, of course, we use the corrected version [3] .
Let (p, g, y A ) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature scheme, and x A his private key. c) α 2 is B-smooth and divides p − 1.
Our contribution
We start this section by describing our main result which is a significant extension Suppose that p ≡ 1 [4] . If we can compute a natural integer i, coprime to p − 1, such that α i mod p is B−smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to generate a digitale signature for any given document without knowing Alice private key.
Proof. Let M be the message that we would like to sign and m = h(M ) be its hashed value. We must find two unknown integers r and s such that α m ≡ y r r s [p].
Let i be a natural integer coprime to p − 1 such that α i mod p is B−smooth and divides p − 1. ElGamal digital signature Equation (1) is equivalent to
If we set β = α i mod p, z = y i mod p, u = r and v = is mod (p − 1), we obtain the new modular equation
Since gcd(i, p − 1) = 1, the element β i mod p is a primitive root. As β x mod p = z, where x is Alice secret key, the triplet (p, β, z) can be seen as the public key of an imaginary user in an ElGamal signature protocol. We do not need the private key
x. For any given document M , by Corollary 2, it is possible to solve equation (4) and to find the unknown variables u and v. Therefore, we generate a signature by giving the couple r = u and s = v i mod (p − 1).
Observe that a trapdoor could be hidden in the generator α by choosing it such that α i mod p is B-smooth and divides p − 1, with a large exponent i.
To illustrate our technique, let us give a numerical example. So, we have signed the message M such that h(M ) = 1234 without using Alice private key x. Any verifier can check that the ElGamal modular equation (1) is valid.
Assume that (p, α, y) is Alice public key. In somehow, our result in Theorem 3 means that, to break the ElGamal digital signature system, it is not needed to have p − 1 a multiple of α as it is claimed by Bleichenbacher [2, 3] , but it suffices to have p − 1 a multiple of anyone of the primitive elements modulo p. Next corollary is another extension. There is a well known particular situation for the generator choice: "Choosing α = 2 is exceptionally bad" [2,3,1,10 p.456]. We extend the case:
Corollary 3. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature protocol.
Suppose that p ≡ 1 [4] . It is possible to forge Alice digital signature for any given message M if we have one of the two conditions:
ii) Number 2 is a primitive element of the multiplicative group Z * p and the positive exponent i such that α i ≡ 2 [p] is computable.
Proof. Similar to the justification of Theorem 3.
Conclusion
In this paper, we determined new primitive elements of the multiplicative finite group Z * p , p prime, for which ElGamal digital signature scheme is no more secure. We therefore made an extension of the old and remarquable result presented by Bleichenbacher at Eurocrypt'96.
